Porting OP-TEE to the RK3576

TL;DR

  • It came up secure end-to-end: memory map + DDR firewall, a real hardware TRNG (RK3576’s RKRNG, not RK3588’s TRNG_V1), and an OTP-derived Hardware Unique Key — xtest passes 113/114 on hardware, and the one miss was a build config, not the platform.
  • The silent console was a forced-override bug. TF-A hands RK3576’s BL32 no non-secure DT pointer, so the normal console probe never runs; needs CFG_EARLY_CONSOLE forced on (not just defaulted) and TF-A/OP-TEE agreeing on UART0.
  • The OTP key is a one-way door, and it’s treated like one: ephemeral HUK by default, persistent fuse-burning gated behind an explicit off-by-default flag until the OTP index is confirmed — burn the wrong row and it’s permanent.
  • Base platform support (#7821) is merged into mainline OP-TEE; the OTP key-derivation half (#7841) is still in review, split out deliberately so the irreversible part gets its own scrutiny.
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A One-Line TF-A Fix, and the Review That Came With It

TL;DR

  • The patch deletes one line — a leftover GICV2_G0_FOR_EL3 := 1 override in plat/rockchip/rk3576/platform.mk that was both redundant (the tree-wide default is already 0) and wrong (RK3576 has no reason to route GICv2 Group 0 to EL3).
  • It’s still the first thing I sent to Trusted Firmware-A, and it got read closely by engineers from ST, Google, and Rockchip before it landed.
  • The point isn’t the diff size — it’s what upstream review actually asks of you even when the change is nearly nothing: is this safe for every configuration, not just yours?
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